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Abstract This paper discusses the potential effects of R&D public subsidies on a strategic issue
for companies, the decision to combine internal and external R&D expenditure. Analyzing some
arguments discussed in the management literature, it is assessed whether public intervention
by granting R&D subsidies inﬂuences the composition of R&D expenditure. To do this, we analyze
the data from the Survey on Business Strategies for the period 1991--2008. Results conﬁrm that
the public funding of R&D expenditure through subsidies have a positive impact on internal R&D
and especially in the decision to conduct R&D internally and externally simultaneously.
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ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cede.2013.01.001rivate expenditure. Its theoretical justiﬁcation is based on
he logic of market failures which argues that in the absence
f Government intervention, incomplete appropriability of
nnovation beneﬁts and difﬁculties in ﬁnancing R&D gener-
te a level of expenditure on R&D below the social optimum
Hall, 2002).
In order to conﬁrm the effectiveness of this policy,
he literature that evaluates the impact of R&D subsi-
ies has grown steadily in recent years by providing a
road base of documentation to assess the impact of
&D public subsidies (Almus & Czarnitzki, 2003; Blanes &
usom, 2004; Busom, 2000; Czarnitzki, 2006; Czarnitzki
Licht, 2006; Duguet, 2004; García Quevedo & Afcha,
s reserved.
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2009; González & Pazó, 2008; Herrera & Heijs, 2007; Lach,
2002).
Traditionally, one of the criteria used in the technology
policy evaluation to assess additionality of subsidies, has
been increasing private R&D expenditure. However, con-
sideration of this variable as an indicator of innovative
efforts made by the company ignores the composition of R&D
expenditure which, far from being homogeneous, includes
elements enforced by different factors. This expenditure
presents a heterogeneous composition widely recognized in
the management literature (Arora & Gambardella, 1990;
Teece, 1986; Granstrand & Pavitt, 1997; Narula, 2001;
Pisano, 1990), which has not received enough attention from
the evaluation point of view of technology policy, although
it may reveal information that could help to improve the
design of it.
Expenditure decisions on internal and external R&D are
conditioned by a variety of economic, technological and
organizational factors as well as their interaction with var-
ious agents in the innovation system. As a central part of
this system, public sector can create through subsidies, soft
loans or tax incentives, mechanisms to inﬂuence directly
over decisions of companies to improve their innovation pro-
cesses.
This paper addresses the effect of direct subsidies ana-
lyzing their impact on the decision of R&D expenditure in
terms of its internal and external composition. The leading
hypothesis argues that public subsidies affect the compo-
sition, implicitly favoring the combination of internal and
external R&D expenditure. Therefore, it inﬂuences the inno-
vative performance of the company. This is based on several
reasons.
On the one hand, some of the recent empirical litera-
ture analyzes the impact of subsidies on the cooperation
agreements in companies. For the speciﬁc case of Spain,
this literature suggests that the percentage of subsidized
companies involved in this type of agreement is higher than
unsubsidized companies (Afcha, 2011; Busom & Fernández-
Ribas, 2008). Furthermore, the receiving of public support
enables companies somehow to prove ﬁnancial viability,
and quality of scientiﬁc and technical R&D activities of
the companies. It reduces uncertainty and helps to correct
information asymmetries that hinder the company access
to external ﬁnancing and marketing of its products in the
technology market (Hall & Lerner, 2010).
Its main contribution lies, therefore, in complement-
ing existing evaluation studies regarding additional ﬁnancial
R&D subsidies, with relevant information on R&D type gen-
erated from the grant receiving. Thus, the analysis of the
composition of R&D expenditure presented in this arti-
cle, involves a more qualitative examination. It allows an
advance in the understanding of mechanisms that underlie
the improvements of innovative results of subsidized com-
panies.
To analyze this effect, we propose the use of a Multino-
mial Logit Model that allows exploring the decisions made
by the company in accordance with the allocation of R&D
resources. This model will allow assessing the inﬂuence
of different types of public funding on decisions regard-
ing internal -- external R&D expenditure. Also, it will allow
assessing both types: R&D expenditure as well as not expen-
diture at all on R&D.
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. Literature review
conomic literature identiﬁes several arguments to explain
hy companies conduct internal and external R&D activi-
ies. At the theoretical level, the theory of transaction costs
Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1989) argues that outsourcing
&D activities makes sense, if and only if, the assumption of
uch activities minimizes the number of transactions neces-
ary to reach R&D investment planned by the company. This
ondition implies that the acquisition of external knowledge
ill only take place if there is a complementary resource
ase and a high level of speciﬁcity between the contract-
ng company and the contractor in order to facilitate the
ransfer of knowledge.
Supported by this theoretical perspective, Audretsch
t al. (1996) analyzed the choice between domestic and
oreign R&D investment in the Manufacturing sector. Their
esults indicate that external knowledge acquisition is more
ikely in those companies that have a higher level of spe-
iﬁc assets for the acquisition and assimilation of foreign
echnology (measured by the level of human capital forma-
ion). Additionally, their ﬁndings highlight the importance
f technological opportunities in the acquisition of exter-
al knowledge, ﬁnding that both types of R&D (internal and
xternal) are complementary in the case of industrial sec-
ors with high-technology intensity and, they also tend to be
ubstitutes in low-technology sectors.
The ﬁndings of Arora and Gambardella (1990, 1994) for
he biotechnology sector, coincide with those in Audretsch
t al. (1996) and with other empirical studies (Watkins
Paff, 2009) when pointing out that the complement of
nternal and external R&D activities occurs especially in
ectors characterized by complexity and rapid technolog-
cal change and shows that in such sectors, the learning
ffect generated by conducting internal R&D plays a decisive
ole in the assimilation of information provided by outside
ources.
In the same approach, Martín de Castro et al. (2009) ana-
yzed for the case of the biotechnology industry in Spain,
he importance of reputation in the formation of strategic
lliances. Their results conﬁrm, in a way, the importance
f internal capacity of the company to absorb external
nowledge that involves the creation of alliances with other
ompanies. Speciﬁcally, the authors include variables such
s innovation and the ability to keep talented staff, as key
lements to establish successful cooperation agreements
ith other companies.
The absorptive capacity hypothesis raised by Cohen and
evinthal (1989) has been accepted frequently to explain
ow the effort or intensity of internal R&D expenditure posi-
ively inﬂuences the use of external knowledge sources. This
nﬂuence appears to be conditioned to the type of partner
hen establishing external relations, in the case of cooper-
tion agreements (Belderbos et al., 2004; Fritsch & Lukas,
001) as well as the number of external relations established
y companies and the type of external relations (outsourcing
r partnership). Dhont-Peltrault and Pﬁster (2011) conclude
hat companies that highly support R&D are increasingly
urning to outsourcing, as a way to reduce transaction costs.
nd those external relations are more frequent when the
ompany uses more generic or standardized technology in
ts production process.
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Along the same perspective, other studies show that
mplementation of internal and external R&D activities gen-
rates positive effects on company performance as a result
f the complement between the two types of R&D. In
his sense, the interaction between domestic R&D expen-
iture and the use of external sources of knowledge has
roven to be particularly a favorable combination for busi-
ess (Veugelers, 1997; Becker & Dietz, 2004; Schmiedeberg,
008).
Similarly, the decision between internal and external R&D
as important implications in economic terms and market
ower. The incursion in R&D internal activities means to the
ompany high early costs and some cases irreversible ones
nd largely recurring (Atuahene-Gima, 1992; Hall, 2002;
arula, 2001; Watkins & Paff, 2009). In this sense, Roper and
ove (2002) explain the decision between internal and exter-
al R&D by analyzing production cost of internal innovations.
mplicitly, they assume that ﬁrms adopt the use of external
&D when the cost of producing innovations in this way is
ess than the adoption of internal R&D. Their results allow
dentifying key elements in making R&D activities internally,
uch as: the generation of economies of scale in innovation
roduction, the size of the company, the plant capacity or
evel of standardization of production.
In contrast, the alternative to acquire external R&D
eans less economic effort, it is, a priori, safer (the hiring
ompany pays for the use of a license, or assumes a venture
ith other partners in the development of a project), and it
oses a risk of a different nature, derived from the threat
f competition. The company that hires external R&D not
lways has the necessary contractual mechanisms to con-
rol property rights arising from the contract activity which,
n highly concentrated markets, could result in the loss of
arket share or the exclusivity on the sale of a new product.
The literature identiﬁes appropriability conditions as a
ey element in the decision of internal and external R&D
Atuahene-Gima, 1992; Roper & Love, 2002). These studies
ighlight the importance of appropriability conditions as key
eterminants in the decision to invest in R&D, arguing that
he higher the concentration of market power is, the more
eluctant the company will be to hire external sources for
he development of their R&D projects or to buy licenses
lready developed, due to the risk to suffer imitations or
eing unable to exploit properly the innovations on which
ompanies do not have complete property rights.
In any case, the choice between the two sources of knowl-
dge should not be considered as a choice of discrete nature
Beneito, 2003), as companies can and do combine internal
nd external R&D. In this sense, the incentives generated by
he public sector may be crucial.
.1. Impact of R&D subsidies on the decision of
nternal--external R&D expenditure
uring the last few years, the promotion of R&D projects
as pursued as objective, besides the increase in pri-
ate R&D expenditure, the improvement of the interaction
f actors in the innovation system (Aerts & Czarniztki,
004; Fier et al., 2006; Busom & Fernández-Ribas, 2008;
chmiedeberg, 2008). This line of action aims to improve the
issemination and transfer of knowledge and the promotion
i
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f the learning process among companies, universities and
echnology centers (Autio et al., 2008).
These elements, coupled with the increasing complex-
ty of the innovation process, create incentives that induce
ompanies to include in their technology strategy, the use
f external sources of knowledge (Cassiman & Veugelers,
002; Rigby & Zook, 2002; Cassiman & Veugelers, 2006).
ecent work has analyzed how public subsidies stimulate
his interaction. Busom and Fernández-Ribas (2008), for ins-
ance, conclude arguing that subsidies have a positive effect
n the establishment of cooperation agreements in the
utonomous community of Catalonia, Spain. Their results
how that subsidy encourages positively toward cooperation
ith customers and suppliers, as well as universities and
esearch centers. Similar results are found by Afcha (2011)
or the case of central and regional subsidies in Spain.
It should be point out that, recent work that analyzes the
ecision of public agencies regarding the granting of subsi-
ies reveal that indeed, both the expenditure intensity on
&D and the collaboration with scientiﬁc institutions, are
actors that inﬂuence signiﬁcantly in the decision of these
gencies for granting R&D subsidies (Huergo & Trenado,
010). This indicates that direct public funding positively
timulates both R&D domestic expenditure and, the acqui-
ition of external knowledge.
More recently, Gelabert et al. (2009) analyze the inter-
ction between R&D public funding and the degree of
ppropriability of the companies on the beneﬁts of their
nnovations. Their results show that R&D public subsi-
ies have a greater impact on R&D domestic expenditure
han those companies that have a lower level of appro-
riability of beneﬁts. This result suggests that subsidies
ould be fulﬁlling their proper role correcting market fail-
res.
In summary, the literature review leads to the conclu-
ion that the decision of internal--external R&D expenditure
s not a trivial decision and the public sector may have an
nﬂuence on this decision. Therefore, the analysis of the
omposition of R&D expenditure in response to receiving a
ubsidy, it is relevant for a better understanding of the effect
f technology policy.
. Data description and methodology
he data used correspond to the Survey of Business Strate-
ies Survey (henceforth ESEE, by its Spanish acronym) for
he period 1991--2008. This survey provides a comprehen-
ive panel data on different areas of business strategy that
llows deepening both, decision process of the company,
nd induced changes in the wake of those decisions. The
ample includes 15,646 observations for 2007 manufacturing
ompanies with more than 10 employees and R&D positive
xpenditure in the period 1991--2008 for at least one year.
Unlike some innovation surveys, the ESEE survey as being
business strategy survey provides data on various areas of
he company. This represents an important advantage since,
s indicated above, the constraints on the choice between
nternal--external R&D belong to various ﬁelds. In addition,
he complexity of the interaction between R&D subsidies
nd the changes in the composition of R&D expenditure
equire the observation of different variables.
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It should be noted that empirical analysis focuses on the
composition of expenditure of the company. Therefore, the
internal R&D variable refers to the cost to ﬁnance R&D activ-
ities carried out within the company, while the external R&D
makes reference to hiring R&D activities out of the com-
pany. To attain this decision, the ESEE survey asks to the
surveyed companies if they conducted or contracted R&D
activities during the ﬁnancial year. Speciﬁcally, the compa-
nies surveyed must choose among the following four possible
situations:
(i) The company has not conducted or contracted R&D
activities.
(ii) The company conducts internally R&D activities but has
not external R&D.
iii) The company has conducted R&D activities but not
internal R&D, and ﬁnally
(iv) The company has conducted internal and external R&D
activities.
Given the nature of the dependent variable to be ana-
lyzed, it is considered that the Multinomial Logit Model is the
most appropriate. The implementation of this model allows
analyzing the inﬂuence of various factors that affect the
composition of R&D expenditure of the company over the
time. Thus, for each company i (i = 1, 2, . . ., n) a decision on
the composition of R&D expenditure can be expressed as:
AIDij = Xijˇij, j = 1, 2, 3, 4; [ε1, ε2, ε3, ε4]∼[0, ˙], (1)
where AIDij represents the type of R&D chosen by the com-
pany, and the set of options j = 1, 2, 3, 4 indicate if the
company decides not to carry out any R&D activities, or con-
duct only external R&D only internal R&D or internal and
external R&D, respectively.
Since the data have a panel structure, it is necessary to
consider that the observations available for each company
can be correlated with each other. Thus, we have proceeded
to estimate the robust standard errors clustered around each
company, which allows this interdependence and conduct
the estimation properly (see Long & Freese, 2006).
The independent variables used in the estimation of the
model are shown in Table 1. To facilitate interpretation of
the data, the variables have been grouped into four (4) cat-
egories: Public funding, R&D activities, Market power and
Firms’ characteristics.
Each of these categories gathers variables used previ-
ously in the literature on the analysis of internal--external
R&D decisions. First, Public funding is the focus of our anal-
ysis and, therefore, it is expected to have a signiﬁcant
effect on the composition of R&D expenditure. Following
recent literature about R&D subsidies evaluation, there are
three different sources of public funding, grants from Cen-
tral Government, Regional Governments, and other agencies
(Czarnitzki & Lopes-Bento, 2011; Fernández-Ribas, 2009,
García Quevedo & Afcha, 2009).
Conducting R&D activities means companies should
pay additional costs, primarily, for the initial investment
required to engage in these activities internally (Hall &
Lerner, 2010). Thus, the variables included in the category
of R&D activities, try to capture the degree of linkage of
companies to R&D activities. The number of patents regis-
tered in Spain and abroad, the license fee, the technical
T
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ssistance from abroad, and the cost of internal--external
&D during the previous year are the variables considered
n this section.
The inclusion of lagged variables in a year of
nternal--external R&D expenditure is to control the persis-
ence of R&D. Thus, both are expected to have a positive
ffect on the decision of internal and external expenditure
espectively.
Additionally, and to complement the analysis of the varia-
les that have a direct impact on the composition of R&D
xpenditure, these are considered variables related to mar-
et power and ﬁrms’ speciﬁc characteristics.
In highly concentrated markets, using external R&D can
e a greater risk on the appropriability of innovations and
herefore the internal R&D is preferred as a source of knowl-
dge acquisition in the presence of few competitors (and
tuahene-Gima, 1992; Roper & Love, 2002). Furthermore,
arket structures characterized by intense competition can
ead the company to develop internal R&D as a source of
ompetitive advantage (Beneito, 2003; Baumol, 2002), a
act that would lead to a situation in contrast to the previ-
usly exposed. In other words, a larger number of companies
ead to higher domestic R&D expenditure. The following
ariables: number of competitors, weighted market share
nd advertising expenses on sales included in the Market
ower section has been included to analyze this point.
Finally, it includes a number of variables related to ﬁrms’
haracteristics such as size, the percentage of foreign cap-
tal, diversiﬁcation of products, level of debt, amount of
ngineers and graduates and the technological intensity the
ompany has.
.1. Descriptive statistics
able 2 shows the descriptive statistics of the independent
ariables included in the analysis, depending on the type
f innovation chosen by the company. In relation to public
unding, it highlights on the one hand the differences in the
mounts of subsidies granted by various levels of Govern-
ent, especially central subsidies the most substantial ones.
n the other hand, it could be noted that for all three types
f subsidies, the amount received by the companies that
onduct both types of R&D is greater than the one received
y companies that conduct only internal or external R&D,
espectively. For R&D activities, again, the performance of
ompanies operating mixed R&D activities, it stands out
bove the R&D performance of companies that only con-
uct internal or external activities. In fact, the descriptive
tatistics for companies that conduct both types of R&D
how, in general, larger companies in terms of number of
mployees and sales, with greater market power and a more
idespread presence in high and medium-high technology
ectors.
. Resultsable 3 shows the results of the Multinomial Logit Model
stimation for different combinations of R&D expenditure
hich were analyzed. Each column compares different com-
inations of R&D expenditure over the option of not making
26 S. Afcha, G. León López
Table 1 Grant subsidies independent variables.
Public ﬁnancing
Central subsidies in thousands of Euros Number of subsidies received from Central Government in thousands of Euros
Regional subsidies Number of subsidies received from Regional Government in thousands of Euros
Other subsidies Number of subsidies received from other agencies in thousands of Euros
R&D activities
Patents in Spain Number of patents registered in Spain
Patents abroad Number of patents registered abroad
Technology imports Licensing Fees and Technical Assistance from abroad, in thousands of Euros
External R&D expenditure R&D expenditure in Euros
Internal R&D expenditure R&D expenditure in Euros
Market power
No. of competitors Categorical variable that indicates the number of competitors in the primary
market of the company
Weighted market share Weighted sum of market share of the company in the market to sell their
products
Advertising expenses on sales Percentage of advertising expenditure, advertising, public relations on sales
Firms’ characteristics
Sales Total sales in Euros
No. of employees Number of employees in the company
Amount of graduates and engineers Amount of graduates and engineers in accordance with total employees
Percentage of equity on liabilities Percentage of equity on total liabilities
Diversiﬁcation index Categorical variable that indicates whether or not the company is diversiﬁes
and, in the latter case, if diversiﬁcation is related or unrelated
Percentage of foreign capital Percentage of participation of foreign capital
Exports volume Variable that reﬂects the value of exports in Euros
Percentage of medium-low tech sector Companies in sectors of medium-low technological intensity
Percentage of medium-high tech sector Companies in sectors of medium-high-technological intensity
Percentage of high technology sector Companies in sectors of high technological intensity
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eny R&D expenditure.1 The sample is composed of innova-
ive companies that perform R&D expenditure for at least
ne year of the analysis period. Therefore, the lack of R&D
xpenditure is occasional, not regular.
Results according to expectations indicate that R&D
ublic Subsidies encourage positively R&D expenditure. In
articular, we can see that the impact of subsidies on compa-
ies that conduct internal-external R&D is higher, followed
y the business effect generated on the companies that just
erform internal R&D expenditure, and ﬁnally the ones that
nly perform external expenses.
To further analyze the impact of public funding on var-
ous combinations of R&D, Table 4 compares the inﬂuence
f the three kinds of subsidies on the possible composition
f R&D expenditure.2 It is possible to conﬁrm receiving R&D
1 The relative risk coefﬁcients are obtained by applying the
xponential function exp(bi) where bi represents the multinomial
egression coefﬁcients. These coefﬁcients indicate the more likely
he company chooses to perform some kind of R&D expenditure
ompared to the option of not making any R&D expenditure at all.
or a detailed explanation see Long and Freese (2006).
2 This comparison is carried out by estimating the ‘‘likelihood ratio
est’’ for different expenditure categories. For a detailed descrip-
ion of the implementation of this procedure see Long and Freese
2006, p. 177).
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iubsidies, favors the adoption of internal and external R&D
xpenditures against the decision to only spend on inter-
al or external R&D. Finally, when comparing the adoption
f performing internal R&D versus just performing external
&D, results show that receiving subsidies from central gov-
rnment and other organisms favors the adoption of internal
&D, while are not signiﬁcant in the case of regional subsi-
ies.
Regarding the other variables, technology imports from
broad adversely affects the possibility of only internal R&D
xpenditure. Furthermore, the Statistical signiﬁcance of the
xpenditure on internal-external R&D in period t-1, con-
rms the persistence in the composition of R&D expenditure.
t shows that to be incurred in internal-external R&D dur-
ng the previous year favors the selection to only perform
omestic R&D expenditure or only the external one during
he current year, respectively. In contrast, having external
xpenses has a negative effect on the ability to perform only
nternal expenses and vice versa. Consistent with this result,
aving engaged in internal--external R&D during the previ-
us year, inﬂuences positively on the option to do both types
f expenditure simultaneously during the usual year.
Regarding the Market Power of companies, only Adver-
ising Expenditure on sales is signiﬁcant and it positively
nﬂuences on the composition of R&D expenditure,
specially in the case of companies’ expenditure on
nternal--external R&D.
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics.
Variable R&D= 0 (N = 5766) Only internal R&D
(N = 3782)
Only external R&D
(N = 1312)
Internal--external
R&D (N = 4788)
Media D.E. Media D.E. Media D.E. Media D.E.
Public funding
Central subsidies.in thousands of
Euros
0.01 1.04 26.88 231.46 6.57 55.63 356.52 3202.25
Regional Subsidies 0.01 0.57 8.30 85.21 6.67 86.85 44.94 558.66
Other Subsidies 0.01 0.96 8.93 109.47 1.43 31.04 36.45 249.88
R&D activities
Patents in Spain 0.09 1.41 0.21 1.10 0.49 8.26 0.72 5.02
Patents abroad 0.03 0.81 0.16 1.33 0.08 0.85 1.19 8.71
Technology imports 118.08 1521.72 503.65 4716.33 868.85 7718.37 1737.25 41,062.7
External R&D expenditure 0 0 0 0 1,192,396 1.08e+07 1,452,442 1.07e+07
Internal R&D expenditure 0 0 624,630.9 4,421,554 0 0 1,955,590 8,907,728
Market power
No. of competitors 1.54 1.10 1.42 0.92 1.52 1.08 1.39 0.86
Weighted market share 12.67 20.04 16.87 20.04 14.48 20.84 16.49 19.24
Advertising expenses on sales 1.25 3.40 1.69 3.52 1.88 4.07 2.27 4.36
Firms’ characteristics
Sales 3.02e+07 9.54e+07 8.24e+07 3.07e+08 9.17e+07 4.56e+08 1.59e+08 5.21e+08
No. of employees 160.05 308.77 368.78 785.03 299.89 740.68 625.63 1399.16
Amount of graduates and engineers 4.10 6.33 5.88 6.38 5.32 6.59 8.20 8.82
Percentage of equity on liabilities 42.54 23.60 44.01 22.02 45.03 22.55 44.87 20.87
Diversiﬁcation index 0.20 0.55 0.29 0.64 0.25 0.61 0.29 0.65
Percentage of foreign capital 17.12 35.97 30.96 44.28 30.16 43.92 30.80 43.99
Exports volume 7,101,936 4.18e+07 2.75e+07 1.86e+08 3.36e+07 2.17e+08 5.99e+07 3.14e+08
Percentage of medium-low tech
sector
34 47 25 43 29 45 23 42
Percentage of medium-high tech
sector
18 38 24 43 23 42 29 45
Percentage of high technology
sector
6 24 17 37 9 29 23 42
28 S. Afcha, G. León López
Table 3 Multinomial logit model. Factors that affect the composition of R&D expenditure.
Multinomial logistic regression
(Std. Err. adjusted for 1862 clusters in id)
(Database result, R&D expenditure = 0)
Log pseudolikelihood =−9529.1675
Wald chi2 (111) = 6403.19
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Pseudo R2 = 0.4583
Variable Only internal R&D Only external R&D Internal--external R&D
Public funding
Subsidies from Central Government 5.4*** (2.77) 4.94*** (2.54) 6.31*** (3.24)
Subsidies from Regional Government 7.99*** (4.54) 8.05*** (4.57) 9.69*** (5.50)
Subsidies from other agencies 4.81*** (2.78) 3.81** (2.21) 5.27*** (3.08)
R&D activities
Patents registered in Spain 1.01 (0.07) 1.05 (0.08) 1.05 (0.08)
Patents registered abroad 1.04 (0.07) 1.05 (0.08) 1.04 (0.08)
Technology imports 0.97** (4.27e−0.6) 1 (1.08e−0.6) 0.99 (9.61e−0.7)
Internal R&D expenditure in t− 1 0.92*** (0.08) 1.32*** (0.01) 1.23*** (0.01)
External R&D expenditure in t− 1 1.37*** (0.01) 0.93*** (0.01) 1.29*** (0.01)
Market power
Number of competitors in the primary market 0.97 (0.03) 1.00 (0.04) 0.95 (0.03)
Weighted market share 1.00 (0.002) 0.99 (0.002) 0.99 (0.002)
Logarithm of advertising expenditure 1.11* (0.06) 1.13* (0.07) 1.22*** (0.06)
Firms’ characteristics
Sales logarithm 1.01 (0.06) 1.09 (0.07) 1.09 (0.07)
Logarithm of employment 1.04 (0.07) 0.90 (0.08) 1.05 (0.08)
Amount of graduates and engineers 1.00 (0.006) 0.99 (0.007) 1.01* (0.006)
Percentage of equity on liabilities 1.00 (0.001) 1.00** (0.002) 1.00** (0.001)
Diversiﬁcation index 1.15*** (0.06) 1.10 (0.08) 1.13** (0.07)
Participation of foreign capital 1.00 (0.001) 1.00* (0.001) 0.99 (0.001)
Logarithm of exports volume 1.02*** (0.007) 1.02*** (0.008) 1.03*** (0.008)
Medium-low technological industrial intensity 0.69** (0.12) 1.00 (0.19) 0.65*** (0.11)
Medium-high technological industrial intensity 1.01 (0.01) 0.09 (0.01) 1.02 (0.01)
High technological industrial intensity 1.39** (0.21) 1.20 (0.22) 1.44*** (0.21)
Temporary dummies Included
N 13,795 13,795 13,795
Note: The coefﬁcients are expressed as relative risk ratios.
* P < 0.1.
c
w
i
p
b** P < 0.05.
*** P < 0.01.
The Percentage of Equity on Liabilities positively affects
ompanies conducting external R&D and mixed R&D,
hile showing no signiﬁcant effect on performing R&D
nternally. This result is consistent with expectations. Com-
anies with fewer ﬁnancial constraints are then able to
t
c
t
Table 4 Effect of public funding on the composition of R&D activ
Internal vs external
Central subsidies 0.09**
Regional subsidies −0.001*
Subsidies from other agencies 0.23***
*P < 0.1.
** P < 0.05.
*** P < 0.01.ear more sunk costs involving internal R&D expendi-
ures.
A priori, greater product of diversiﬁcation would be asso-
iated with the use of generic production technologies and
herefore the use of external R&D in areas where applied
ities of the company.
External vs mixed Internal vs mixed
−0.16*** −0.25***
−0.18*** −0.18***
−0.10*** −0.33***
usin
R
T
m
F
A
A
r
r
R
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
B
B
B
B
B
B
BPublic funding of R&D and its effect on the composition of b
processes do not require a high specialization. So contrary
to expectations, the variable used to measure the level of
diversiﬁcation of production shows a positive inﬂuence in
the case of companies that only perform internal R&D expen-
diture, while it shows no inﬂuence in the case of those that
only perform external R&D.
The degree of Internationalization of the company, as
measured by the volume of exports reveals a positive and
signiﬁcant inﬂuence in all cases, it reﬂects the general trend
of international markets require a rule, higher levels of com-
petitiveness and, therefore, it would be associated to any
of the efforts made in this regard.
Finally, membership in high-technology sectors favors in
the case of companies that perform only internal R&D, while
in the case of companies that perform internal--external
R&D. Technological intensity of the sector positively affects
both, high-tech sectors as well as those with medium-high
technological intensity.
5. Conclusions
This paper identiﬁes the key variables that inﬂuence the
composition of R&D expenditure and its connection with
R&D subsidies. For this reason, we used a Multinomial
Logistic Model that allows analyzing different potential com-
binations of R&D expenditure of innovative companies. Only
internal R&D, only external R&D, internal--external R&D and
R&D expenditure equals zero.
This model allows moving the technology policy evalua-
tion focused on the intensity of the effect of R&D subsidies,
to an assessment that examines the strategic decisions of
the company in the ﬁeld of innovation. This analysis identi-
ﬁes factors that inﬂuence the company’s decision regarding
the allocation of internal--external R&D expenditure.
The main results show that public funding, regardless
the level of Government grants, positively stimulates R&D
expenditure. This effect includes both companies, the ones
engaged in internal or external R&D expenditure, and the
ones that perform both R&D expenditure.
Additionally, when analyzing how it affects the reception
of subsidies on companies making external R&D, compared
to the option of internal and mixed R&D, the results indi-
cate that in both cases, public funding favors the adoption of
internal R&D. Finally, when comparing internal R&D option
to undertake joint internal and external activities, the
results show that the receiving of subsidies favors joint adop-
tion of R&D activities.
As a complement, it is possible to conﬁrm the importance
of the type of activity performed during the previous period,
which is directly relevant to the activity, but opposite of
the unrealized activity. In other words, those companies
that perform internal R&D tend to continue performing only
internal R&D, or combine both internal and external R&D,
but not to perform only external R&D.
Overall, results conﬁrm the importance of public funding.
It highlights in particular the encouragement of compa-
nies to combine their expertise internally with sources
of information produced by third parties through external
R&D expenditure. Considering that the literature suggests
complementary effects on innovative output of companies
associated with interaction between internal and external
Cess R&D expenditure 29
&D, especially in dynamic and high-technology sectors.
hese results provide a starting point for understanding the
echanisms that underlie indirect effects of R&D Public
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